21 June 2014

Unarmed residents of the town of Shabelkivka, in the Donetsk Oblast, got together after representatives of the Donetsk People's Republic refused to leave their area and drove away the armed militants and dismantled their checkpoint.

However this morning, according to Ukrainska Pravda newspaper, unidentified armed men in armoured personnel carriers and trucks with “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR) symbols broke into the territory of the DTEK Mine Komsomolets Donbasa. This mine belongs to oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. These intruders forced the employees in the administrative building to lie face down and turn off all mobile phones. At the time, there were some 700 people in the mine. Several DPR representatives broke into the administrative building and demanded money and transportation at gunpoint. Since there was no cash at the mine, the DPR people entered the garage and parking area.

“As a result, almost the entire fleet of the mine was seized: 13 KrAZ trucks for transporting rock, 5 Gazelle trucks and 4 cars. The invaders also broke into two ATMs located at the mine,” DTEK managers reported.

The remaining armed DPR men blocked the roads to the mine, preventing the second shift of miners –  some 800 people — from going to work. People were trying to cross the line of armed men, but the DPR people opened fire.

Clashes continue throughout Donetsk, in spite of Poroshenko's ceasefire. 

From Mychailo Wynnyckyj, June 21, 2014

The strategy of NATO, the EU, and the G-7 towards Russian aggression in Ukraine has been reactive. Almost 3 months have passed since Putin’s outrageous violation of the post-Cold War world order. The state of shock in international community diplomatic circles should have worn off by now, but surprisingly, political elites appear to be immune even to seemingly lunatic encroachments on Europe’s established borders. Indeed the fact that Putin’s defiance of international law is so blatant, and the Kremlin’s justifications for such action are so completely unorthodox (patently opposite from the truth), leaves one to believe that the only possible diagnosis for Putin’s state of mind is lunacy.

... What are the aims of the West with respect to Russia?

Russia simply refuses to play by the rules, and regardless of how much the Kremlin is urged to return to the established institutional framework, mutual trust has been undermined to such an extent that it will never be restored.

Does this state of affairs inevitably mean a return to Cold War styled global separation? This is clearly not a desirable option in western capitals: firstly, because few wish to believe that a real ideological divide exists between Moscow and the rest of the world (after all, the Russians are nominally “capitalist” – just like “us”), and secondly, most recognize that the difference between “Cold War” and “frozen conflict” is semantic rather than substantive – maintaining a status quo of arrested conflict requires continuous effort, life in the disputed territory (i.e. economic and social development) is suboptimal, and risk of return to violence is always high. In other words, if Russia (Putin) is to be contained, the West had better be prepared to pay a very high and long-term price for it.

Is there another solution? From a West European perspective, that question depends on several values-based decisions:

1) Where does the border of Europe lie? ... During the past 6 months, Ukrainians have demonstrated their European-ness more than many citizens of EU countries (including restraining from violence in Crimea); the decision is now up to the Europeans – will they accept Ukrainians as their own?

2) Can Europe tolerate a neo-fascist government in Russia? I thank Prof. Alexander Motyl (a participant in the NATO analyst mission) for this formulation because, in the past, I have not been brave enough to call the current Kremlin regime what it is. Apparently, comparisons between Putin and Hitler are not well received in western intellectual circles these days, but the fact that during the run-up to the EU Parliamentary elections, every single European extreme right party proclaimed support for the Kremlin’s policies towards Ukraine (see Prof. Timothy Snyder’s numerous publications on this), makes one wonder why identifying the Russian as neo-fascist should be considered illegitimate by mainstream politicians. Western democracies have an ugly history of tolerating authoritarianism when it is in their economic interests, and of ignoring atrocities that such regimes perpetrate. This time, will the EU look the other way while Russia perpetrates ethnic cleansing, territorial annexation, and subsidizes terrorism on Europe’s borders? 

3) Is the EU’s proclaimed post-modernist “soft power” foreign policy a reality, or have we in fact become a world where “might mean right”? 

Limited economic sanctions have been implemented, Russia has been expelled from the G-7, and its membership in several European institutions has been suspended, but Crimea remains occupied, and mercenary fighters in eastern Ukraine continue to be funded and supplied from Russia. The EU has prided itself on projecting “soft power” (e.g. M. Leonard’s “Why Europe will run the 21st Century” 2005), but soft power only works when one’s neighbours are democracies (i.e. where public opinion matters), and when policy is shaped by rational pursuit of national self-interest (i.e.  a regime cares about the economic welfare of its citizens). 

For the moment, Europe stands for reaction – and limited reaction at best. Generating a proactive policy requires a goal. Strategy cannot be formed if an “end state to be achieved” by implementing the strategy is not envisioned. This may seem obvious, but it is the crux of the current problem faced by Europeans (and by the US as the senior partner in NATO). Put simply: if the regime in Russia is a problem (globally), then what alternative is more desirable?

This is a question that most policymakers simply refuse to ask. 

...

At the moment, no one is calling for “boots on the ground” in the Donbas (that would be unrealistic anyway), but today’s reports of renewed troop movements on Russia’s western border, and video footage of tanks bearing Russian flags moving through Luhansk oblast, indicate that Putin has no intention of reducing the intensity of his aggression against Ukraine. For the moment he still has the initiative. Some have placed high hopes in President Poroshenko’s peace plan (announced today) which involves Ukrainian troops ceasing hostilities for 7 days to allow Russian mercenaries to leave the country, or to face destruction next week. OK – that’s Plan A, and I genuinely hope it works. But what’s Plan B?

And what is the West’s long-term strategy with respect to Mr. Putin? Containment is an option, but that will be expensive. To maintain its status as a buffer state, Ukraine must become a showcase for EU soft-power, and a huge recipient of NATO military assistance – i.e. a kind of post-war Germany and late 20th century Israel wrapped into one. Can the EU, US and Canada afford to provide that kind of assistance? Wouldn’t it be cheaper to just get rid of the threat? 

But what are the consequences [no longer Wynnyckyj's words, but this blog author's] of intervention? over 150 Ukrainian military personnel have been killed since the 'occupation' in the East. Added to this are the hundreds of residents displaced, and people who were convinced that 'change' would come in the form of the Self-proclaimed people's republic of Donetsk. For many, it seemed a good idea that quickly faded into death, violence and even worse living conditions (Slovyansk, for example, is continuing to be a war-zone). And what of Crimea? What is there to be done? The 'west' seems to think the annexation is now an inevitability. But what of Crimeans? Does the international political-economic-military complex ever care about people?